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I. Introduction
This survey article discusses the major EU competi-
tion law developments in the pharmaceutical sector
from 1 November 2015 through 31 December 2016.
Section 2 addresses cases on restrictions of competi-
tion from generic suppliers, including the Lundbeck
and Servier cases now on appeal to the EU courts,
the new GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) decision in the UK,
the European Commission’s annual patent settlement
monitoring exercise and the judgement of the French
Supreme Court in Sanoﬁ-Aventis. Section 3 covers the
recent cases prosecuting excessive pricing, including
the Aspen case in Italy and the Pﬁzer/Flynn and
Actavis cases in the UK. Section 4 addresses the cases
before the EU Court of Justice concerning licensing
agreements, including Hoechst/Genentech and Roche/
Novartis. Section 5 addresses recent decisions, judge-
ments, and regulations in EU Member States on the
ongoing issue of parallel trade. Finally, Section 6 cov-
ers the results of sector inquires reported by competi-
tion authorities in ﬁve EU Member States covering a
broad range of issues arising in the pharmaceutical
sector.
II. Restriction of competition
from generic suppliers
A. Reverse-payment patent settlements
1. Lundbeck
In September 2016, the General Court issued its judge-
ments in its ﬁrst ever case on reverse-payment patent
settlements in the pharmaceutical sector, upholding the
Commission’s decision against Lundbeck, the Danish
pharmaceutical company, and the generic manufac-
turers Alpharma, Merck KGaA/Generics UK, Arrow,
and Ranbaxy.1
The settlement agreements at issue involved Lundbeck’s
blockbuster anti-depressant citalopram, for which the
compound patent had expired, but Lundbeck still
had patents covering its manufacturing processes. The
Commission’s decision indicates that, around the time
when the generic suppliers were about to enter the mar-
ket, Lundbeck threatened legal action against the generic
suppliers for violation of its process patents. Thereafter,
Lundbeck and the generic suppliers entered into settle-
ment agreements, in which Lundbeck made payments
to the generic suppliers and they allegedly agreed not to
enter the market for the duration of the agreement.
On appeal, the General Court upheld the Commission’s
decision in all respects and there is little independent
analysis of the decision—on each point, the General
Court essentially repeated the Commission’s analysis and
said it agreed. While the circumstances and agreements
for each settlement were different, and thus each judge-
ment by the General Court—one for each of Lundbeck
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1 Case T-472/13, Lundbeck v. Commission (‘Lundbeck Judgment’), Case
T-471/13; Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v. Commission, Case
T-470/13; Merck v. Commission, Case T-469/13; Generics (UK) v.
Commission, Case T-467/13; Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v.
Commission and Case T-460/13; Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and
Ranbaxy (UK) v. Commission (8 September 2016).
Key Points
• The main activity continues to be in the area of
reverse-payment patent settlements (the Lundbeck
and Servier cases are winding their way through the
appeals process at the EU Courts; and a new deci-
sion was issued against GlaxoSmithKline in the UK).
• On the contentious issue of the pricing of medicines,
the UK and the Italian competition authorities
issued decisions against alleged excessive pricing.
• There have also been new developments in the
areas of licensing and distribution/parallel trade,
and national competition authorities have pub-
lished results of recent sector inquiries in ﬁve EU
Member States.
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and the generics—is different, there are certain common
core issues that are important from the standpoint of the
development of competition law and policy. These are
discussed brieﬂy below.
• Potential competition. A threshold issue in each case
was whether Lundbeck and the generic were potential
competitors. According to the General Court, a gen-
eric is a potential competitor as long as it has taken
concrete steps to enter the market such as obtaining a
marketing authorisation and securing a source of
supply. The Court rejected the argument raised by
Lundbeck and numerous generics that a generic could
not be a potential competitor because Lundbeck’s
process patent must be presumed to be valid and,
thus, if the generic entered the market, it would do so
in violation of the patent. The Court emphasised that
‘at risk’ entry is not illegal and that the generic entrant
might eventually be successful in having the patent
invalidated. According to the Court, ‘the presumption
of validity cannot be equated with a presumption of
illegality of generic products validly placed on the
market which the patent holder deems to be infrin-
ging the patent.’2
• ‘By object’ infringement. The General Court found
that the settlements constituted restrictions of compe-
tition ‘by object’ so that it was not necessary to
establish anticompetitive effects. The General Court
found that the settlements were equivalent to standard
market-sharing agreements that had long been con-
demned under EU competition law, rejecting the argu-
ment of Lundbeck and the generics that the existence
of a patent meant that the settlements were much dif-
ferent from plain-vanilla market-sharing agreements
and, thus, a ‘by object’ approach was inappropriate. As
with its analysis of potential competition, the General
Court gave little weight to Lundbeck’s patent, empha-
sising that there was uncertainty concerning its validity
as no court had yet issued a deﬁnitive ruling on that
issue.
• Payment. The payments made by Lundbeck to the
generics were critical to the ﬁnding of a restriction by
object. According to the Commission, when a settle-
ment is made without a payment or other transfer of
value from the originator to the generic, it is unlikely
to raise competition concerns as the settlement likely
would be the result of the parties’ independent assess-
ments of the patent situation. In contrast, where
there is a payment, it may well be that it is the pay-
ment rather than the patent that causes the generic to
agree not to enter the market for a certain period.
The General Court agreed with the Commission that
the core problem with a payment is that it eliminates
the uncertainty faced by the originator concerning
whether its patent is valid and ensures that there will
be no entry by the generic. The General Court
rejected the argument that the payment may simply
reﬂect an asymmetry of risk as between the originator
and the generics in that the originator has much
more to lose if the patent is struck down or held not
to be infringed.
Lundbeck and the generic suppliers have appealed the
judgements to the Court of Justice. These appeals offer
the Court of Justice a superb occasion to provide guid-
ance on how to strike the correct balance between intel-
lectual property and competition law. The arguments
on appeal are likely to centre on the role of the patent
in both the analysis of potential competition and
whether there is a restriction by object. The General
Court’s judgement seems to endorse a low threshold
for the existence of potential competition as it seems
sufﬁcient that the generic has taken steps to enter the
market. The existence of a patent would rarely, if ever,
be viewed as excluding potential competition as the
generic would always have at least some chance of win-
ning in any eventual patent litigation. Likewise, the
General Court seems to gloss over the patent in con-
cluding that there is a restriction of competition by
object. This conclusion seems questionable as it neces-
sarily assumes that the originator would have little
chance of excluding the generic in the absence of the
agreement. Lundbeck and the generics will undoubt-
edly seek to convince the Court of Justice that the
General Court failed to analyse properly the role of the
patent in reaching its conclusions.
This case also offers the Court of Justice an unusually
good opportunity to clarify the scope and meaning of a
‘by object’ restriction. As it seemed to take the combin-
ation of a sector enquiry, a 10-year investigation and a
466-page decision for the Commission to reach the con-
clusion that the settlement agreements at issue in this
case infringed Article 101, it would seem at least ques-
tionable whether they should be treated as ‘by object’
restrictions that ‘by their very nature’ are restrictive of
competition, particularly in light of the Court of Justice’s
ruling in Cartes Bancaires,3 in which it seemed to narrow
2 Lundbeck Judgment, para. 121. 3 Case C-67/13P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission
(11 September 2014) (not yet reported).
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the scope of the ‘by object’ restriction. Moreover, it
would seem at least debatable whether the agreements
had the kind of high likelihood of restricting competi-
tion that characterises restrictions by object given that
the available evidence seemed to suggest that Lundbeck
had a reasonable chance (40 per cent to 50 per cent) of
winning the patent litigation.
2. Servier
In Servier, the Commission imposed a ﬁne of €331 mil-
lion on Servier, the French pharmaceutical company,
and ﬁnes totalling €96 million on ﬁve generic manufac-
turers—Unichem, Matrix (now Mylan), Teva, Krka, and
Lupin.4 This decision is currently on appeal to the
General Court.5 The agreements involved Servier’s best-
selling blood pressure medicine, perindopril. Servier’s
basic molecule patents had expired in 2003, but it still
held a number of patents related to the manufacturing
process and the product’s formulation, which the
Commission described as ‘secondary’ patents. Generic
manufacturers were challenging these patents before
various courts and, at the same time, preparing to enter
the market.
The Commission’s decision in Servier differs from
the Lundbeck decision in two basic respects. First, while
the Commission only analysed the settlement agree-
ments under a ‘by object’ test in Lundbeck, it hedged its
bets and also applied an ‘effects’ test in Servier. Second,
the Commission found that, in addition to entering into
agreements that restricted competition in violation of
Article 101, Servier’s conduct constituted an abuse of
its dominant position in violation of Article 102. This
is the ﬁrst time that the Commission has applied
Article 102 to late life cycle management strategies since
its decision in AstraZeneca, and is therefore useful in
understanding its thinking. The Commission began its
analysis by emphasising that a strategy designed to pro-
tect an originator’s market position against generic entry
is ‘generally legitimate to the extent it resorts to mea-
sures representing competition on the merits,’ which it
described as competition on product quality and the
strategic use of IPRs and the patent system.6 In contrast,
a dominant company’s use of measures that deviate
from competition on the merits and are capable of pro-
ducing foreclosure effects will be subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
Applying these principles to Servier’s late life cycle
management strategy, the Commission found that Servier
had abused its dominant position by engaging in a
‘single and continuous exclusionary strategy’ that con-
sisted of both acquiring technology that would have
allowed generic manufacturers to make a product that
did not infringe Servier’s process patents and the con-
clusion of the settlement agreements.7 In ﬁnding that
these features of Servier’s strategy were abusive, the
Commission emphasised that they took place in the
context of a broader strategy aimed at curbing generic
entry that included the creation of a patent thicket
and efforts to convince regulators to adopt stricter
product speciﬁcations that favoured Servier’s product.
While the Commission did not establish that these
practices contributed to foreclosure effects, it never-
theless found them to be pertinent to its analysis
insofar as they explained why competition from gener-
ics was limited to certain avenues that Servier then
proceeded to shut off through its acquisition of tech-
nology and the settlement agreements.8 This approach
seems inconsistent with the Commission’s declaration
that strategic use of patents is generally not problem-
atic and is disturbing in that it seems to suggest that
it will be easier to ﬁnd that conduct is abusive if it
takes place in the context of an entirely legitimate IP
and regulatory strategy aimed at combatting generic
competition.
The abuse identiﬁed in Servier is also interesting in
that the Commission went out of its way to construct
an abuse that did not consist of a single action taken
in isolation, but rather was a combination of various
activities—the acquisition and the settlements. To link
these activities, the Commission borrowed the phrase
‘single and continuous act’ so familiar in the context of
its cartel decisions.9 It underscored that the technology
acquisition and the settlements were ‘intertwined’10 and
‘complementary,’11 forming a ‘clear pattern’12 of con-
duct where Servier targeted potential entrants to remove
the competitive threat. In the Commission’s view, the
technology acquisition and the settlements were neces-
sary complements to a successful exclusionary strategy
as they shut off the two principle routes to market for
4 Case AT.39612, Servier, Decision of 9 July 2014.
5 See Cases T-705/14, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, T-701/14, Niche
Generics v Commission, T-691/14, Servier and Others v Commission,
T-684/14, Krka v Commission, T-682/14, Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v
Commission, T-680/14, Lupin v Commission, T-679/14, Teva UK and
Others v Commission, T-677/14, Biogaran v Commission.
6 Servier, para. 2766.
7 Servier, para. 2774.
8 Servier, para. 2772.
9 Servier, paras 2962–2963 and footnote 3804.
10 Servier, para. 2783.
11 Servier, para. 2777.
12 Servier, para. 2794.
207SURVEYDavid W. Hull and Michael J. Clancy . The Application of EU Competition Law
generics—inventing around the patented process or
convincing a court to issue a ﬁnding of invalidity or
non-infringement.13
In concluding that the technology acquisition con-
tributed to the foreclosure effects of its single and con-
tinuous exclusionary strategy, the Commission found
that Servier did not acquire the technology to improve
its own production processes (as there was evidence
that Servier did not use the technology), but rather
to reinforce its thicket of blocking patents.14 The
Commission examined the technological landscape in
some detail and found that the technology acquired
by Servier was the most advanced in terms of poten-
tial to bring a product to market and, thus, repre-
sented the most immediate competitive threat to
Servier. By acquiring the technology, Servier fore-
closed competitors from the market.
Turning to the settlements, the Commission found
that they fell outside competition on the merits and also
contributed to the foreclosure effects of Servier’s strat-
egy. According to the Commission, Servier engaged in
unilateral abusive conduct by using the proﬁts it reaped
in a market where it was dominant to buy off competi-
tors.15 The Commission highlighted that the settlements
were a ‘chain of agreements which were mutually reinfor-
cing’16 and that they formed part of a pattern pursuant
to which Servier ‘systematically targeted’ close potential
competitors.17
All of these issues are likely to feature prominently in
the eventual judgements of the General Court in the
appeals that have been ﬁled by Servier and the generics
against the Commission’s decision. In light of the strong
views held by those on each side of this debate, it would
seem likely that the ruling of the General Court would
be appealed to the Court of Justice, which means that it
could be a number of years before these issues are
ﬁnally settled.
3. GlaxoSmithKline
Taking its cue from the Commission’s decisions in
Servier and Lundbeck, the Competition and Market
Authority (CMA) imposed ﬁnes totalling £44.99 million
on GSK and two generic manufacturers in February 2016
for entering into reverse-payment patent settlements in
connection with the anti-depressant drug paroxetine.18
In 2001, a number of generic manufacturers sought
to enter the UK market with a generic version of GSK’s
blockbuster Seroxat. At the time, Seroxat was one of the
world’s most popular anti-depressants and one of GSK’s
best-selling products. GSK challenged these pharma-
ceutical companies alleging that generic products were
infringing its patents. GSK concluded agreements not-
ably with Generics (UK) Limited and Alpharma where
GSK agreed to make payments and other value transfers
totalling over £50 million. In turn, GUK and Alpharma
agreed to refrain from entering the UK market for par-
oxetine from 2002 to 2004.
The CMA held that these settlement agreements
avoided competition from the threat independent gen-
eric entry could offer and deprived the National Health
Service of the price falls that normally result from gen-
eric competition. Like the European Commission in
Servier, the CMA relied on both a ‘by object’ and ‘by
effect’ theories in ﬁnding an infringement of Article
101. In addition, the CMA found that GSK had abused
its dominant position in violation of Article 102 as the
payments to the generics meant that GSK took actions
that were different from those characteristic of ‘normal
competition.’
The CMA’s decision is now on appeal to the UK’s
Competition Appeal Tribunal.19 As the CMA’s decision
is largely consistent with the approach of the European
Commission in Lundbeck and Servier and, given the
similarity of the issues, it will be interesting to see how
the UK litigation plays out in light of the concurrent
appeals of the EU cases in Luxembourg.
4. Patent settlement monitoring report
The Commission continues to monitor patent settle-
ments in the pharmaceutical sector. Each year, the
Commission requests originator and generic compan-
ies to submit copies of all patent settlement agree-
ments covering EU/EEA markets concluded during
the previous calendar year together with related agree-
ments. The apparent aim of this annual monitoring
exercise is to identify reverse-payment patent settle-
ments and other settlements that could delay generic
entry, such as those that contain restrictions extend-
ing beyond the geographic or material scope of the
patent.
13 Servier, para. 2794.
14 Servier, para. 2776.
15 Servier, para. 2933.
16 Servier, para. 2942.
17 Servier, para. 2945.
18 Paroxetine, Case CE-9531/11 (12 February 2016).
19 Case no. 1251/1/12/16, Generics (UK) Limited v. Competition and
Markets Authority, Case no. 1252/1/12/16, GlaxoSmithKline PLC v.
Competition and Markets Authority, Case no. 1253/1/12/16, Xellia
Pharmaceuticals APS and Alpharma LLC v. Competition and Markets
Authority, Case no. 1254/1/12/16, Actavis UK Limited v. Competition and
Markets Authority, Case no. 1255/1/12/16, Merck KGAA v. Competition
and Markets Authority.
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With language essentially verbatim from previous
monitoring reports, the Seventh Monitoring Report20
discusses the main categories of settlements and then
provides an overview of the replies submitted by com-
panies and an analysis of the main characteristics of the
settlements falling within particular categories. The
report also sets out statistics for the latest year, although
these statistics are of little use in understanding what is
actually happening. For example, the Report states that
the number of settlements has increased, but this is a
meaningless statistic unless it is compared to the num-
ber of cases litigated, which the Report fails to do.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the monitoring
report is that the categories used to classify settlements
in terms of the degree of competition law risk attached
to them provide little useful information and arguably
have a chilling effect on settlements that could be pro-
competitive to the extent that they would allow early
generic entry. These categories had their origin in the
Commission’s Report on the Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry, which is somewhat ironic given that, in this
Report, the Commission explicitly disavowed reaching
any conclusions concerning the application of competi-
tion law in the pharmaceutical sector.21 Settlements fall-
ing in Category A and Category B.I are considered to be
generally unproblematic, which is not surprising as
Category A settlements are those that allow immediate
market entry by the generic, and those in Category B.I
are those where there is no value transfer from the ori-
ginator, i.e. where the generic agrees to enter after
patent expiry. It is questionable whether settlements in
these categories are settlements at all in the sense that
the one side or the other has capitulated entirely.
Settlements falling in the remaining category—
Category B.II—which do not allow immediate entry by
the generic and involve a value transfer from the origin-
ator to the generic are deemed the most likely to raise
competition law concerns. The problem with this cat-
egory is that it includes almost every form of settlement
that would seem to fall within the normal deﬁnition of
the term and, thus, risks discouraging companies from
entering into meaningful settlements at all, including
those that would allow early entry. For example, this
category includes a common form of settlement that
would seem to be benign in most circumstances: early
entry by the generic. The Commission itself admits that
such settlements are ‘not likely to attract the highest
degree of antitrust scrutiny.’22 Instead of using such
vague language, it would be helpful if the Commission
clearly stated that such a settlement would be unlikely
to raise concerns. More generally, after 7 years of moni-
toring as well as having adopted decisions in Lundbeck
(conﬁrmed by the General Court) and Servier, it would
seem that the Commission has enough experience under
its belt that it could issue some form of guidance to
companies that put meat on the bones of the sparse
guidance found in its monitoring reports.
B. Denigration
On 18 October 2016, the French Supreme Court issued
its judgement in the Sanoﬁ-Aventis case concerning
denigration of generic competitors.23 In the judgement,
the Court afﬁrmed a prior judgement of the Paris Court
of Appeals,24 which in turn upheld the decision of the
French competition authority ﬁnding that Sanoﬁ-
Aventis had abused its dominant market position and
imposing a ﬁne of €40.6 million.
In its 2013 decision, the competition authority found
that Sanoﬁ-Aventis had engaged in a marketing cam-
paign that systematically discouraged the use of generic
versions of Sanoﬁ-Aventis’ blockbuster Plavix by high-
lighting that the generics used different salts from the
original version and that they were not indicated for use
in combination with aspirin for acute coronary syndrome
(ACS). The authority considered this marketing cam-
paign to be misleading. While Sanoﬁ-Aventis did not
claim that the use of different salts could affect the efﬁ-
cacy or safety of a generic, or that the use of generics
with aspirin to treat ACS was dangerous, it implied as
much, which created doubts in the minds of doctors and
pharmacists concerning generics. As doctors are reluctant
to change their prescribing habits and are risk averse,
any dissemination of negative information or insinuation
that a generic product may present risk will be sufﬁcient
to convince doctors not to prescribe it and pharmacists
not to provide it to the patient when given a choice.
In essence, Sanoﬁ-Aventis was found to have misled
by omission. It had failed to explain that the generics
used a different salt because of Sanoﬁ-Aventis’s patent
over its salt and that this use of a different salt did not
affect the safety or efﬁcacy of the generic. Similarly, it
had failed to explain that generics did not have an indi-
cation for the use of the drug in combination with
20 European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent
Settlements, December 2016.
21 European Commission, Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry Report, July 2009, p. 6 (It is important to note underline that …
[the report] does not identify individual cases of wrongdoing or provide any
guidance on the compatibility of the practices examined with the EC
competition rules).
22 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, para. 12.
23 French Supreme Court, Case no. 890 (18 October 2016).
24 Paris Court of Appeal, Case no. 2013/12370 (18 December 2014).
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aspirin to treat ACS because Sanoﬁ-Aventis had a
patent over this use.
Before the French Supreme Court, Sanoﬁ-Aventis
argued that it was simply providing information about
the existence of its patent over a salt used in the original
version of the drug (which meant that the generic had
to use a different salt) and a patent over the use of the
drug with aspirin to treat ACS (which meant that the
generic could not be used with aspirin to treat ACS).
This could not be construed as denigration given that
this information was based on objective and veriﬁed
data, a fact which had been acknowledged by the Court
of Appeals. Sanoﬁ-Aventis further contended that its
communication aimed at presenting its drug in an
objective and sufﬁciently comprehensive manner so as
to enable healthcare professionals to verify this informa-
tion and to form their own opinion on the therapeutic
value of the drug. As such, Sanoﬁ-Aventis argued that
the Court of Appeals erred in law by ruling that the
information was misleading when it had, at the same
time, acknowledged that the data communicated were
objective and veriﬁed.
In its judgement, the French Supreme Court con-
ﬁrmed the strict approach taken by the competition
authority and afﬁrmed by the Court of Appeals towards
communications made by originators to promote their
products in the face of generic competition. The Supreme
Court recognised that Sanoﬁ-Aventis knew from experi-
ence that healthcare professionals are risk averse. It also
agreed with the Court of Appeals that, in light of this
risk aversion, any dissemination of negative informa-
tion or insinuation about the quality of a drug may suf-
ﬁce to discredit it before doctors. Further, the Court
noted that the campaign had an effect on the market as
a number of doctors wrote ‘non-substitutable’ on pre-
scriptions and pharmacists substituted Sanoﬁ-Aventis’s
own generic version of its drug rather than that of
other generics.
The Supreme Court thus found that the Court of
Appeals did not err in law, as a signiﬁcant number of
healthcare professionals had actually been inﬂuenced by
the information communicated by Sanoﬁ-Aventis which
held a dominant position on the relevant market. As
such, the denigration practice carried out by Sanoﬁ-
Aventis had the effect of limiting generic entry onto the
market, in breach of competition law.
This judgement conﬁrms that originators need to be
careful in raising concerns about generics, as a marketing
campaign may be held to be abusive if it creates unsub-
stantiated doubt in the minds of doctors and pharma-
cists about the quality of the generic. It also shows that
originators need to be careful in seeking to prevent off-
label use of generics that would allow them to compete
with the originator’s drug.
III. Excessive pricing
Competition authorities have continued to investigate
pricing strategies of originator companies, with the
most important developments this year in the area of
excessive pricing.
A. Policy considerations
Although competition authorities frequently face strong
public and governmental pressure to pursue pharma-
ceutical suppliers for charging excessive prices, they are
generally reluctant to launch such cases because it is dif-
ﬁcult to determine the ‘correct’ price, intervention on
pricing may chill innovation, and national health
authorities and other payors often have strong buyer
power that mitigates competition law concerns. This
reluctance is illustrated by the European Commission’s
decision not to open an investigation into allegations of
excessive prices for Hepatitis C drugs, despite pressure
from members of the European Parliament. In response
to two parliamentary questions, the Commission noted
that Member States have both economic bargaining
power and regulatory powers to control the prices of
pharmaceutical products, and that such powers were
being used to limit the prices of the Hepatitis C drugs.25
However, as illustrated by the Aspen, Pﬁzer/Flynn
Pharma and Actavis cases discussed below, competition
authorities are willing to pursue excessive pricing cases
where the product has been on the market for some time
and there is a drastic price increase. In these circum-
stances, the ‘old’ price of the product provides a ready
point of comparison for determining whether the new
price is excessive. Moreover, as the product has been on
the market for some time, the originator has presumably
had time to recoup its R&D costs, which mitigates the con-
cern that intervention on pricing could chill innovation.
B. Aspen
On 29 September 2016, the Italian Competition
Authority imposed a ﬁne of €5.2 million on Aspen
25 European Commission, Response to Parliamentary Question P-008636/
2014 (22 December 2014) and Response to Parliamentary Question
E-000261-15 (31 March 2015).
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Pharma for abusing its dominant position by charging
excessive prices for the supply of certain drugs used in
the treatment of cancer, which were known as ‘Cosmos’
drugs.26 These drugs had been on the market several
decades and all patent rights had expired. Aspen bought
the trade mark and marketing rights to these drugs
from GSK in 2009. The competition authority found
that Aspen had increased prices 300 per cent to
1,500 per cent as compared with the prices previously
charged by GSK in an effort to bring the prices in line
with those charged for the drugs in other Member
States.
In ﬁnding that Aspen’s price increases were abusive,
the competition authority applied the test for excessive
pricing ﬁrst developed by the EU Court of Justice in
United Brands. First, the authority engaged in an in-
depth economic analysis of the difference between the
new prices of the Cosmos drugs and their production
costs, and concluded that it was signiﬁcant. In its ana-
lysis, the authority took note of the absence of any
investments by Aspen in order to improve the quality
and innovation of the products or to promote their sale.
Second, the authority examined whether the signiﬁ-
cant difference between the prices and costs could be
justiﬁed, and concluded that it could not. In reaching
this conclusion, it stressed that the drugs were life sav-
ing and that there was no substitute; that Aspen was a
generics company and not engaged in research and
development of drugs and its business model was to
acquire existing drugs and exploit market niches by rais-
ing prices; and that Aspen’s price increase had used up
a signiﬁcant amount of the national health budget.
One aspect of the competition authority’s decision
that could be particularly troubling to pharmaceutical
companies is its willingness to examine Aspen’s negoti-
ating strategy vis-à-vis AIFA, the Italian health author-
ity, as part of its analysis of whether Aspen’s conduct
was abusive. According to the authority, Aspen adopted
a very aggressive negotiating strategy towards AIFA in
order to obtain a favourable deal. It ﬁrst requested
AIFA to re-categorise Cosmos drugs so that their prices
would no longer be regulated by agreement and could
instead be set freely by Aspen, with the costs being
borne by patients, as opposed to being reimbursed
under the national health system. When AIFA refused,
Aspen demanded a substantial upward revision of
prices. Aspen also threatened to reduce or terminate
supplies of the drugs to the Italian market if AIFA
refused to agree to the price increase.
C. Pﬁzer/Flynn
On 7 December 2016, the CMA imposed a £84.2 million
ﬁne on Pﬁzer and £5.2 million ﬁne on Flynn Pharma for
allegedly charging excessive and unfair prices for pheny-
toin sodium capsules, an epilepsy drug.27 It also ordered
the companies to reduce their prices.
Prior to September 2012, Pﬁzer had sold phenytoin
sodium capsules at a regulated price to wholesalers under
the brand name Epanutin. However, in September 2012,
Pﬁzer sold the UK distribution rights for Epanutin to
Flynn Pharma. Flynn promptly de-branded or ‘gener-
icised’ the drug, which meant that its price was no longer
subject to regulation. Since 2012, Pﬁzer supplied pheny-
toin sodium capsules at prices that were not only signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the prices it had charged previously
(between 780 per cent and 1,600 per cent), but that
were also signiﬁcantly higher than the prices it charged
in any other European country. Flynn, in turn, increased
the prices charged to wholesalers and pharmacies by
2,300 per cent to 2,600 per cent.
In ﬁnding that these price increases were excessive,
the CMA highlighted that the drug had been on the
market for many years and that there had been no
recent innovation or signiﬁcant investment. Thus, as
with the Aspen case, the CMA did not believe that
its intervention would deter innovation as the origin-
ator had already had plenty of time to recoup its
investment.
Pﬁzer argued that it needed to increase prices because
Epanutin was loss-making before it was de-branded.
However, the CMA rejected this argument, pointing out
that such losses would have been recovered within two
months of the price increase.
Both Pﬁzer and Flynn Pharma have announced that
they will appeal the CMA’s decision.28 Both companies
emphasised that the prices charged for their drug were
less than alternative equivalent drugs on the UK market
that had long been regulated and had appeared to be
acceptable to the UK Department of Health.
26 Italian Competition Authority, Case A-480 (29 September 2016).
27 Competition and Market Authority, Press Release, CMA ﬁnes Pﬁzer and
Flynn £90 million for drug price hike to NHS, December 2016 <https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-ﬁnes-pﬁzer-and-ﬂynn-90-million-for-
drug-price-hike-to-nhs>.
28 Pﬁzer, Press Release, Pﬁzer statement on Competition and Markets
Authority’s infringement decision, 7 December 2016 <http://www.pﬁzer.co.
uk/latest-news/2016-12-07-pﬁzer-statement-competition-and-markets-
authority%E2%80%99s-infringement-decision>; Flynn Pharma, Press
Release, CMA issue infringement Decision against Flynn, 7 December 2016
<http://www.ﬂynnpharma.com/about-us/news/cma-issues-infringement-
decision-against-ﬂynn>.
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D. Actavis
On 16 December 2016, the CMA issued a Statement of
Objections to Actavis in which it set out provisional
ﬁndings that Actavis had charged excessive prices for
hydrocortisone tablets.29 The CMA found that Actavis
had increased the price of 10mg tablets by over 12,000
per cent compared to a branded version of the drug that
was sold by a different company prior to April 2008.
More speciﬁcally, the price rose from £0.70 per pack in
April 2008 to £88 per pack by March 2016. It also found
that the prices of 20mg tablets had increased by nearly
9,500 per cent. In explaining its decision, the CMA also
emphasised that the payor had no choice but to buy the
drug because it was a life-saving drug that was the pri-
mary replacement therapy for people with adrenal
glands that do not produce sufﬁcient amounts of ster-
oid hormones.
IV. Licensing agreements
A. Royalties on invalid/expired patents
On 7 July 2016, the EU Court of Justice issued a ruling
addressing the question of whether EU competition law
prohibits the enforcement of a royalty provision in a
license agreement where the licensed patent has been
held to be invalid.30 The question was referred to the
Court by the Paris Court of Appeals in the context of its
review of an arbitral award that ordered Genentech to
pay more than €100 million in royalties to Hoechst.
The dispute between Genentech and Hoechst con-
cerned a 1992 licensing agreement covering two US
patents and one European patent, the latter having
been revoked in 1999. The license agreement allowed
Genentech to use the licensed technology for research
purposes for an annual licensing fee as well as a roy-
alty on the manufacture, use, and sale of the licensed
products.
According to Hoechst, Genentech never paid the
required royalties. Hoechst notiﬁed Genentech that it
believed that Genentech was selling products that
infringed the licensed patents. Genentech promptly ter-
minated the agreement. Hoechst initiated arbitration
proceedings seeking the payment of royalties relating to
the sale of the drug Rituxan. The arbitral tribunal found
in favour of Hoechst and ordered Genentech to pay
more than €100 million in royalties on the use of the
technology in its product even though the use of the
technology did not violate Hoechst’s patents, which had
been revoked. It reasoned that Genentech had agreed to
make royalty payments in return for the certainty of
avoiding patent litigation, and Genentech had received
the beneﬁt of that certainty.
Genentech appealed the arbitrators’ decision to the
Paris Court of Appeals, seeking annulment of the arbi-
tral award. The Paris Court of Appeals referred to the
Court of Justice the question of whether Article 101 pre-
vents a licensor from requiring a licensee to pay royalties
for the entire duration of an agreement, notwithstanding
the revocation of the licensed patent or the absence of
patent infringement.
Before the Court of Justice, Genentech argued that
the arbitrator disregarded the terms of the patent license
agreements and of Article 101 by requiring it to pay
royalties on sales of a product which did not infringe
the licensed patents. Genentech submitted that, if it
were required to pay royalties, these additional costs
would place it at a disadvantage as compared with its
competitors, and would distort competition in breach of
Article 101.
The Court of Justice rejected this argument, holding
that Article 101 does not prohibit a contractual royalty
obligation for the use of a technology that is no longer
protected by a patent, as long as the licensee is free to
terminate the agreement. As Genentech was free to ter-
minate the agreement with Hoechst at any time, the
Court found that the royalty obligation did not restrict
competition.
B. Coordination among competing suppliers
In the ongoing Roche/Novartis case in Italy, now on
appeal to the Italian Council of State, the Court on 25
March 2016 referred ﬁve questions to the EU Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling.31 This case arose from
appeals against the February 2014 decision of the Italian
competition authority imposing ﬁnes of €92 million on
Novartis and €90.6 million on Roche for allegedly
attempting to restrict competition between two pro-
ducts, Avastin and Lucentis. The Regional Court of
Lazio upheld the authority’s decision on 5 November
2014, and its judgement was appealed to the Council of
State.
29 Competition and Markets Authority, Press Release, Pharmaceutical
company accused of overcharging NHS, 16 December 2016 <https://www.
gov.uk/government/news/pharmaceutical-company-accused-of-
overcharging-nhs>.
30 Case C-567/14, Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH and Sanoﬁ-Aventis
Deutschland GmbH (7 July 2016).
31 Request for preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged
on 25 March 2016, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG, La Roche SpA, Novartis AG
and Novartis Farma SpA v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del
Marcato, Case C-179/16, OJ (2016) C 222/4.
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The case involves two drugs developed by Genentech
that came out of a research programme aimed at ﬁnding
ways to stop the process of blood-vessel formation called
angiogenesis, which feeds tumour growth in cancer
patients and also causes certain eye diseases. The ﬁrst
drug to be developed was Avastin, which was designed
to treat cancer. A couple of years later, a derivative of the
main compound in Avastin was developed into Lucentis,
a drug to treat eye disease. Before Lucentis came onto
the market, doctors used Avastin on an ‘off-label’ basis
to treat eye disease as well. In other words, even though
Avastin was only approved for the treatment of cancer,
doctors also prescribed it for treating the eye disease, an
unregistered or ‘off-label’ use.
As Genentech did not have a sales network in
Europe, it licensed the products out—Avastin to Roche,
its parent company, and Lucentis to Novartis. Avastin
was sold at a maximum price of €81 per injection in
Italy, while Lucentis was much more expensive—it
started at a price €1,700 per injection, which was later
lowered to €900. Before Lucentis was launched on the
Italian market, Avastin was widely prescribed by doc-
tors on an ‘off-label’ basis to treat eye disease. The
Italian regulatory regime allowed such off-label use of a
drug if there was no registered treatment available.
Once Lucentis was launched on the Italian market, the
off-label use of Avastin for eye disease was no longer
reimbursed because there was now a drug available that
was registered for the treatment of eye disease. The
switch from Avastin to Lucentis for the treatment of eye
disease led to a dramatic increase in the cost of treating
the eye disease, which generated the complaints by pri-
vate healthcare clinics and the Italian Ophthalmological
Society that led the competition authority to open its
investigation.
After a year-long investigation, the competition
authority concluded that Roche and Novartis had col-
luded to prevent Avastin from being used for the treat-
ment of eye disease. More speciﬁcally, they had carried
out a campaign aimed at artiﬁcially differentiating
Avastin and Lucentis by raising safety concerns about
the off-label use of Avastin to treat eye disease. The
authority found numerous communications between
the two groups, particularly between the managers of
their respective Italian subsidiaries, to this effect as well
as internal documents discussing this strategy. It also
pointed out that Roche had sought a change to the label
of Avastin highlighting the risks of using Avastin to
treat eye disease. The two companies also sought to
downplay independent studies showing that the two
drugs were equivalent. The authority emphasised that
Roche had an economic incentive to prevent Avastin
from being used off label to treat eye disease because,
as Genentech’s parent company, it stood to gain more
from the royalties paid to Genentech by Novartis for
sales of Lucentis than from sales of Avastin.
In their appeal against the decision, Roche and
Novartis argued that the restrictions on the off-label use
of Avastin were the result of the decision of the Italian
regulatory authority and were not caused by an illegal
agreement. The evaluations carried out by the Italian and
EU regulatory authorities indicated that Lucentis and
Avastin are not equivalent for the purpose of treating eye
disease. Roche and Novartis also emphasised that the sys-
tematic off-label use of drugs is unlawful, particularly in
a situation where a drug has been approved for the same
therapeutic indication. In short, it would have been
unlawful to sell Avastin for the eye treatment under the
relevant regulatory rules.
The Lazio Regional Court rejected these arguments
and upheld the decision of the competition authority. It
brushed aside the regulatory arguments raised by Roche
and Novartis by ﬁnding that they were outside the scope
of its competence and, thus, not relevant to its review of
the decision. It then proceeded to ﬁnd that Avastin and
Lucentis were competing products as the ﬁle contained
evidence that Avastin was used off-label to treat eye dis-
ease in competition with Lucentis. Finally, it found that
Roche and Novartis had entered into an illegal agree-
ment to prevent Avastin from being used in competition
with Lucentis, pointing to evidence in the ﬁle of com-
munications to this effect between the parties.
On further appeal, the Italian Council of State has
now put questions to the EU Court of Justice relevant to
troubling issues in this case. In particular, the Council
of State has asked whether parties to a licensing agree-
ment could be regarded as competitors if the licensee
is operating on the relevant market solely by virtue of
the license agreement. In the decision, the competition
authority treated the relationship between Roche and
Novartis as a horizontal relationship between competi-
tors, despite the apparent fact that, absent the license,
Novartis would not have competed with Roche.
The Council of State has also asked a number of ques-
tions relating to the interplay between relevant pharma-
ceutical regulatory regime and the competition law
regime and focusing on the issue of whether a product
not approved by the relevant regulatory authorities
may nevertheless be included in the relevant market.
V. Parallel trade
Ongoing investigations, appeals and legislative initia-
tives at the national level illustrate that the legality of
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measures to limit parallel trade remain an active issue in
the pharmaceuticals industry. These cases also illustrate
the ongoing legal uncertainty in this area, with different
legal standards applied in different countries. These dif-
fering legal standards broadly reﬂect the fact that paral-
lel trade has different effects depending on the country,
with higher priced countries receiving beneﬁts from the
parallel trade of lower priced medicines, but with lower
priced countries facing disadvantages such as medicine
shortages,32 higher prices,33 and decreased competition
among distributors in the local market.34
A. Sweden
In November 2016, the Swedish competition authority
announced the rejection of a complaint by a Swedish dis-
tributor, ApoEx, alleging that multiple pharmaceutical
suppliers and logistical service providers had illegally
refused to supply products for export.35
Under Swedish law, pharmaceutical suppliers are
under an obligation to supply drugs ordered under a
retail license (e.g. orders by pharmacies), and such
drugs may not be exported outside Sweden. In con-
trast, pharmaceutical suppliers are not obliged to sup-
ply drugs in connection with orders placed under a
wholesale license, which may be exported.
ApoEx held both retail and wholesale licences, and
had placed large orders from the pharmaceutical suppli-
ers without specifying under which license it was making
the purchase. ApoEx claimed that these orders estab-
lished an ordinary pattern of supply by the pharmaceut-
ical suppliers, including the supply of products for
export, and that the pharmaceutical suppliers had abused
their respective dominant market positions by later limit-
ing the volume of products supplied to ApoEx.
The Swedish competition authority rejected ApoEx’s
complaint. First, on the issue of whether the pharma-
ceutical suppliers were dominant, the authority appeared
to adopt a broad market deﬁnition under which the sup-
pliers would be unlikely to be dominant. The authority’s
reasoning is based upon the judgement of the General
Court in the GSK Spain case, which indicated that the
relevant market for the wholesale of pharmaceuticals for
export should be deﬁned broadly to include all products
capable of being sold at a proﬁt owing to the price differ-
ential between the local and export markets.36
Second, on the issue of abuse, the authority rejected
ApoEx’s claims that there was an established supply
relationship between it and the pharmaceutical suppliers
with respect to orders for wholesale, which could be
exported. In particular, the authority rejected the claim
that ApoEx’s past orders made without specifying
whether the order was for retail or wholesale established
such a relationship with respect to wholesale orders.
The authority also determined that the pharmaceutical
suppliers were not obliged to supply ApoEx as a new
customer once ApoEx made it clear that it was making
orders pursuant to its wholesale license.
The rejection of ApoEx’s complaint is a favourable
decision for pharmaceutical suppliers, as it acknowledges
that deceptive tactics adopted by wholesalers to obtain
products for export do not establish an ordinary course
of dealing, requiring pharmaceutical suppliers to con-
tinue supplies. The reasoning underlying this decision is
broadly the same as that adopted in the UK by Justice
Roth in Chemistree Homecare Ltd v Abbvie Ltd.37
B. Spain
In contrast to Sweden and the UK, in Spain, the
Supreme Court has adopted a more restrictive approach
to measures implemented by pharmaceutical suppliers
to control parallel trade.
In a judgement of 4 March 2016,38 the Supreme
Court held in favour of the European Association of
Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) in a case con-
cerning allegations that pharmaceutical suppliers were
illegally restricting parallel trade. The case began with a
complaint by EAEPC to the Spanish competition author-
ity, alleging that the pharmaceutical suppliers imple-
mented a system of dual pricing in their distribution
agreements, pursuant to which lower prices applied to
products reimbursed by the Spanish healthcare system,
while higher prices applied other sales in order to dis-
courage exports to higher priced markets. EAEPC
alleged that these agreements illegally hindered parallel
trade in violation of the EU and Spanish competition
laws concerning anticompetitive agreements.
32 Case C-468/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE
Farmakeftikon Proïnton (16 September 2008), para. 68.
33 Pharmaceutical suppliers may refuse to agree to offer lower prices if
signiﬁcant volumes of the products will be resold into higher price
markets. The net effect of this is that the lower income countries may not
be able to afford as many treatments for their citizens.
34 Consistent with the judgement in GSK Greece, pharmaceutical suppliers
implement supply quotas in order to limit parallel trade into higher priced
countries. However, these supply quotas may also have the effect of
limiting competition among distributors in the local market, because
distributors will have little incentive to compete for new customers if they
are not able to increase their level of supplies.
35 Swedish Competition Authority, Case no. 791/2015 (10 November 2016).
36 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission (27 September
2006), para. 159.
37 Chemistree Homecare Ltd v Abbvie Ltd [2013] EWHC 264, Case no.
HC13D00013 (11 February 2013).
38 Spanish Supreme Court, Case 200/2013 (4 March 2016).
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Following a decision by the competition authority
rejecting the complaint, EAEPC appealed to the Spanish
courts, ultimately leading to the Supreme Court’s judge-
ment in which it upheld EAEPC’s challenge and rejected
the appeal by the pharmaceutical suppliers. In particu-
lar, the Court rejected the arguments of the pharma-
ceutical suppliers that the alleged dual pricing was solely
the result of the Spanish pricing and reimbursement
laws, instead noting that the applicable laws did not
require the pharmaceutical suppliers to sell products for
export at a higher price. This reasoning in the judge-
ment is principally based on the prior judgements of the
Spanish courts in the Spain Pharma case39 as well as the
prior judgement of the EU General Court in the GSK
Spain case.40
In light of this judgement, the CNMC is now
required to further investigate EAEPC’s complaint, and
thus appears likely to open a formal investigation of
the distribution systems of the pharmaceutical suppliers
involved. A similar investigation has also been ongoing
since March 2015 following the earlier judgement of the
Spanish Supreme Court in the Spain Pharma case.41
C. Romania
In Romania, the national competition authority con-
tinues to actively prosecute illegal distribution practices
and restrictions on parallel trade. In June 2016, the
authority announced that it had opened an investigation
into revisions to Novartis’ distribution system, under
which it intended to directly distribute its products to
certain pharmacies, in parallel with its traditional distri-
bution system (presumably through intermediate whole-
salers).42 This case appears to cover similar issues to the
ongoing case concerning the direct distribution system
of GSK, in which draft commitments were published in
September 2015.43
D. Regulations limiting parallel trade
Due to the shortages caused by the export of medicines
from lower income countries, and the legal restrictions
placed on the ability of pharmaceutical suppliers to
themselves limit parallel trade, national governments in
lower income countries have adopted additional regula-
tory measures to limit parallel trade.
The Commission has acknowledged that ‘Member
States themselves are best suited to monitor and ensure
the continuous supply of medicines in their territory’,44
and thus that they are entitled to take restrictive mea-
sures to address shortages, provided that the measures
are necessary for the protection of health and life of
humans and do not go beyond what is necessary in order
to attain it.45 However, the Commission’s approach does
not seem to be entirely consistent as it frequently second
guesses the legality of national measures, which creates
undesirable uncertainty.
The following are examples of recent regulatory
developments:
• In Italy, pharmaceutical professional associations
together with certain regions, the Italian Ministry of
Health and AIFA signed a common position on the
enforcement of national law.46 This position aims at
avoiding shortages of drugs based on national obliga-
tions requiring wholesalers to guarantee a permanent
and adequate range of medicinal products, prohibit-
ing exports by wholesalers in speciﬁc circumstances
and prohibiting exports by pharmacies to foreign dis-
tributors/wholesalers.
• In Romania, the Health Ministry has published a
draft order aimed at avoiding shortages by reducing
exports. Under the order, the government may ban
exports of a drug if there have been shortages for 7
consecutive days. This order will take effect after the
National Medicines and Medical Devices Agency
conﬁrms that exports are the reason for the shortages
as opposed to, for instance, safety issues.47
• In Portugal, wholesale distributors of medicinal pro-
ducts for human use must notify their intention to
export medicines considered ‘at risk of shortage’ by
the authorities, and provide information on the
export operations that have been carried out. In May
39 National High Court, Case no. 450/2009 (13 June 2011).
40 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission (27 September
2006), paras 66–70.
41 Spanish Competition Authority, Case S/DC/0546/15 <https://www.cnmc.
es/expedientes/sdc054615>.
42 Romanian Competition Council, Press Release, The Competition Council
launched for public consultation the report on sector inquiry on pharma
market, June 2016 <http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/
items/id11025/utila_farma_iun_2016.pdf>.
43 Romanian Competition Council, Press Release, The Competition Council
launches for public debates the commitments formulated by S.C.
GLAXOSMITHKLINE S.R.L., September 2015 <http://www.
consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id10394/dezb_angaj_gsk_sept_
2015_english.pdf>.
44 European Commission, Response to Parliamentary Question E-009560/
2015 (1 October 2015).
45 European Commission, Response to Parliamentary Question P-002868-16
(13 June 2016).
46 The position adopted is available here (in Italian): <http://www.salute.gov.
it/imgs/C_17_notizie_2702_listaFile_itemName_0_ﬁle.pdf> (8 September
2016). The text provides an interpretation of the Decree no. 216/2006.
47 Romanian Health Ministry, draft order (‘Ministerul Sănătăţii, Ordin
SĂNĂTĂŢII, pentru aprobarea Normelor de aplicare a prevederilor art.
699 pct. 19 si̦ art. 804 alin. (2) din Legea nr. 95/2006 privind reforma in̂
domeniul sa ̆năta ̆ti̧i’) (December 2016).
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2016, the European Commission issued a reasoned
opinion criticising the lack of transparent criteria for
distributors to determine whether the medicinal pro-
ducts were at risk of potential shortage due to parallel
trade. According to the Commission, these notiﬁca-
tion requirements constitute an unjustiﬁed restriction
on the export of medicines, and the Commission
requested that Portugal remove them.48
• In Slovakia, a regulation obliges wholesale distribu-
tors to notify the government of the export of all
human medicines and observe a 30-day waiting peri-
od before exporting them, which would give the gov-
ernment time to react in the event of a shortage. In
May 2016, the Commission issued a reasoned opin-
ion ﬁnding the duration of the notiﬁcation dispro-
portionately long and requesting that Slovakia change
the law.49
• In the Czech Republic, proposed legislation would
allow the authorities to monitor and evaluate the
risk of shortages for particular medicinal products
and to prohibit exports when justiﬁed. The legisla-
tion also requires distributors to notify their inten-
tion to export ‘irreplaceable’ medicines and imposes
a waiting period of 15 days, during which time the
authorities may evaluate whether to issue an order
prohibiting the export.50
VI. Sector inquiries
Beyond cases and merger investigations, competition
authorities in multiple Member States have conducted
sector inquiries addressing a broad range of potential
issues arising in the pharmaceutical sector, including
competition among vaccines, limitations on entry of
generics and analogous products, illegal distribution
practices, reference pricing, exchange of sensitive infor-
mation among competitors and competition among
pharmacies and wholesalers.
A. Italy
In May 2016, the Italian competition authority published
the results of its sector enquiry into competition in the
market for human vaccines (excluding ﬂu vaccines).51
While the report acknowledges that suppliers have
brought new, innovative vaccines to the market, it also
notes that the prices have risen signiﬁcantly over the past
20 years and that the proﬁtability of suppliers is higher
than the pharmaceutical sector average.
The report thus proceeds to discuss competition pro-
blems present in the sector, including (i) the presence of
an oligopoly of only four major suppliers holding 80 per
cent of the global market; (ii) the lack of generic
vaccines due to IP protection and the high levels of
investment required to develop vaccines; (iii) a lack of
competition among vaccines for certain diseases; and
(iv) a lack of transparency on the part of the suppliers
concerning the different prices they charge in different
countries depending upon economic factors such as
GDP and ability to pay. In response to these problems,
the authority recommends action at Italian and EU
levels, inter alia, to increase the possibilities for the
development of generic vaccines, and ensure that pur-
chasing decisions take into account the therapeutic
properties and cost effectiveness of the vaccines, as well
as potential therapeutic equivalence with other compet-
ing vaccines.
The report also includes statements that, while not
clear, could indicate the possibility for the authority to
launch individual infringement investigations against
suppliers for unfair pricing where prices for mature pro-
ducts steadily increase rather than decline over time, or
against conﬁdentiality agreements preventing purcha-
sers from obtaining information on suppliers’ pricing in
other regions or countries.
B. Romania
In June 2016, the Romanian competition authority pub-
lished a 499-page report setting out the results of its sec-
tor enquiry into various practices in the pharmaceutical
sector,52 and highlighting the following issues (among
others):
• Low levels of generic penetration in some segments.
The report notes that, despite lower prices, generics
have failed to achieve high market shares in some
segments, in part due to the high marketing spending
by pharmaceutical companies, leading doctors to
48 ‘May infringement’s package: key decisions’, European Commission Fact
sheet (26 May 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
1823_en.htm>.
49 ‘May infringement’s package: key decisions’, European Commission Fact
sheet (26 May 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
1823_en.htm>.
50 European Commission, Response to Parliamentary Question P-002868/
2016 (13 June 2016).
51 Italian Competition Authority, Press Release, Investigation into human




52 See Romanian Competition Council, Press Release, The Competition
Council launched for public consultation the report on sector inquiry on
pharma market, June 2016 <http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/
docs/items/id11122/utila_farma_iun_2016_english.pdf>.
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prescribe branded medicines. In response, the report
recommends various measures to increase the use of
generic medicines.
• Barriers to competition among pharmacies. The
report notes that many patients receive discount
cards from doctors that could only be used to buy
medicines from speciﬁc pharmacies. As this practice
has led to a high concentration of sales of medicines
at only a few pharmacies throughout the country, the
report recommends prohibiting this practice.
• Amendments to distribution systems. The report notes
recent changes by pharmaceutical suppliers to their
distribution systems, including to direct-to-pharmacy
distribution systems or to systems using a limited
number of distributors. With respect to such changes,
the authority highlights that dominant companies
must ensure that the revised systems create beneﬁts
for pharmacies, hospitals, and patients that are quan-
tiﬁable (in terms of quality, service, ﬁnancial beneﬁts,
and availability) and that such beneﬁts at least equal
to those arising under the prior distribution systems.
In connection with the publication of the report, the
competition authority announced an investigation into a
potential abuse of dominance by Novartis for its alleged
implementation of a pilot direct distribution system for
speciﬁc pharmacies, while maintaining its traditional dis-
tribution system (discussed further above).
C. Lithuania
In December 2016, the Lithuanian competition author-
ity announced the results of its sector enquiry into the
market for reimbursable medicines.53 The ﬁndings of
the authority include:
• Restrictions on entry by cheaper, analogous products.
Entry for analogous but cheaper pharmaceuticals is
restricted due to the regulatory framework that
favours manufacturers who offer more expensive
pharmaceuticals.
• Problems with reference pricing system. While prices of
pharmaceuticals are set by reference to the prices in
other countries, the authority noted that the prices
referenced from other countries were the publicly
declared prices, rather than the lower conﬁdential net
prices. The authority also noted that reference pricing
was not appropriate for Lithuania as it did not encour-
age suppliers to reduce prices.
• Exchange of sensitive information among suppliers.
The current legal framework facilitates the exchange
of commercially sensitive information among manu-
facturers of medicines, affecting both competition and
the prices for reimbursable pharmaceuticals.
Based on these ﬁndings, the authority recommended
measures to: (i) encourage the entry of pharmaceuticals
which are analogous, equally efﬁcient, but cheaper; (ii)
take into account the lower net prices when referencing
prices of pharmaceuticals in other countries; (iii) elimin-
ate the ability of market players to obtain information
about prices applied by competitors; and (iv) ensure
that consumers are better informed about cheaper, but
equally efﬁcient, pharmaceuticals.
D. Denmark
In Denmark, the Danish Competition Council pub-
lished its report in October 2016 of the results of its sec-
tor enquiry into the market for the wholesale supply of
medicines to hospitals and pharmacies.54 With respect
to distribution to hospitals, the enquiry found signiﬁ-
cant competition among wholesalers and by suppliers
distributing their products directly. In contrast, with
respect to distribution to pharmacies, the enquiry found
that there is only limited competition between the two
main wholesalers holding over 95 per cent of the mar-
ket, in part due to regulations limiting price competition
and barriers to the entry of new competitors. The report
thus recommends remedial measures to increase com-
petition in the market, including (i) reducing existing
barriers that prevent new players from distributing
medicines to pharmacies; (ii) increasing wholesalers’
opportunities to compete on prices charged to pharma-
cies; and (iii) increasing pharmacies’ incentives to
actively scan the wholesale market and purchase the
best value-for-money product in terms of both medi-
cines and service.
E. Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Commission for the
Protection of Competition also announced the results of
its sector enquiry, which found issues such as a shortage
of reimbursed drugs and the lack of an appropriate
53 Lithuanian Competition Council, Press Release, Final conclusions of
market study on reimbursable pharmaceuticals, December 2016 <https://
kt.gov.lt/en/news/ﬁnal-conclusions-of-market-study-on-reimbursable-
pharmaceuticals>.
54 Danish Competition Council, Report, Serious problems on the market for
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mechanism for regulating exports, which in turn increase
the risk of shortages of life-saving drugs for patients in
Bulgaria.55
VII. Conclusion
With the settlement cases now largely behind it, it will
be interesting to see where the European Commission
turns next. The robust use of Article 102 to counter
late life cycle management strategies in Servier may
be a harbinger of increased enforcement activity with
regard to generic entry. National authorities and
courts will almost certainly continue to be very active
in this sector with pricing likely to continue to be a
focus of enforcement activity in light of the concern
over the impact of high-priced drugs on national
healthcare budgets.
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55 Bulgarian Competition Authority, Press Release, 28 December 2016 (only
in Bulgarian: <https://www.cpc.bg/default.aspx>).
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